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Let us vote in multitude
To echo the voice of community
Only when we vote
Then needs and concerns will be addressed
We would no longer be ignored
So don’t take democracy lightly.
Opening verse of “Power of the Ballot,” a Vietnamese American 
voting song (see page 26).
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In California, the pronounced disparity in civic participation across communities with differing 
socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics is especially problematic. Our state is home to a diverse 
population of residents, a substantial portion of whom are newcomers to this region and the 
country. In addition, many long-time residents, particularly those in low-income and ethnic 
communities, feel disconnected from the political process and are therefore disinclined to engage 
in civic affairs. As a result, there is a signifi cant gap in the makeup of Californians who regularly 
participate in elections — and therefore have disproportionate political clout — and the state’s 
full population of eligible voters.
The James Irvine Foundation, with a mission to expand opportunity for the people 
of California, established its California Perspectives program to improve decision making 
on signifi cant state issues. We recognize that sound public decision making requires good 
information, effective decision-making systems and representative public participation.
As part of our efforts toward this end, in 2006 the Foundation launched the California 
Votes Initiative, a multiyear effort to increase voter participation in targeted areas and evaluate 
the effectiveness of various nonpartisan strategies for increasing voting rates. This report documents 
fi ndings from the fi rst phase of the initiative, through March 2007. In 2009, a subsequent report 
will summarize cumulative fi ndings and insights from the voter outreach conducted for the June 
2006 through November 2008 elections.
This initiative explicitly seeks to test various approaches to improve voting rates among 
infrequent voters and to lead us to a deeper understanding of the relative effectiveness of various 
nonpartisan voter outreach strategies. Since we are testing various approaches with a goal of 
identifying those strategies that yield the best results, we expect to see varied results across the 
organizations funded by Irvine, as documented in this report. In sharing these initial fi ndings, we 
hope the report provides civic organizations, the philanthropic community and others who seek 
to boost civic participation with a deeper understanding of the potential to encourage broader 
participation in our elections and thereby foster more representative public decision making.
 
 James E. Canales
 President and Chief Executive Officer 
 The James Irvine Foundation  
 September 2007
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Substantial numbers of California’s eligible voters do not participate in state and local elections, 
resulting in public decision making that fails to refl ect the needs and perspectives of the full 
population. Low levels of voter participation within low-income and ethnic communities can limit 
elected offi cials’ awareness of and responsiveness to the interests and concerns of these communities.
As part of the California Votes Initiative, The James Irvine Foundation supported a cadre 
of nonprofi t organizations enlisted to mobilize voters in local communities having signifi cant 
populations of low-income households and residents of minority ethnicity. In the weeks leading up 
to the June and November 2006 elections, these organizations used a variety of outreach approaches 
to increase turnout, including congregation-based outreach, neighborhood-based outreach, live 
phone calls, multilingual materials and information provided via ethnic and mainstream media. 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of these mobilization efforts, the authors of this report 
collaborated with these local organizations to conduct a series of fi eld experiments. Results from 
these two elections indicate a strong correlation between the level of personal connection made 
through outreach and the likelihood that the members of a community with historically low 
voter participation will vote. 
The California Votes Initiative
In early 2006, The James Irvine Foundation launched the California Votes Initiative to accomplish three goals: 
1. Improve voting rates among infrequent voters — particularly those in low-income and ethnic communities 
in the San Joaquin Valley and the Southern California counties of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside 
and San Bernardino.
2. Glean lessons about effective approaches to increasing voter turnout among these populations and share 
with the civic engagement fi eld in California and across the country.
3. Encourage increased policymaker and political candidate attentiveness to low-income and ethnic communities 
by demonstrating a growth in voter participation among these groups.
The Initiative supports nonpartisan voter education and outreach conducted by nine community-based 
organizations that are employing a range of strategies to encourage infrequent voters to participate in elections, 
including door-to-door outreach, phone banking, voter forums, mailers and other methods. 
To date, the Initiative has provided voter outreach support and evaluation for two election cycles in 2006 
and one in 2007. Prior to its completion, the Initiative will provide support, conduct an evaluation and share 
fi ndings from election cycles in 2006, 2007 and 2008. Additional information about the Initiative is available 
at www.irvine.org.
Executive Summary
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Best Practices
To date, the California Votes Initiative has uncovered or confi rmed the following best practices for voter 
mobilization efforts in low-propensity voter communities. 
1. Campaigns should ideally use face-to-face canvassing.
2. Phone bank calling is enhanced by pre-screening and follow-up with those who earlier expressed 
an intention to vote.
3. Canvassers should be well-trained and drawn from the local communities of interest.
4. An information-rich message may be more effective than a basic one.
5. Going to the fi eld too early can decrease the effectiveness of a campaign.
Among outreach techniques attempted, the evaluation found that face-to-face canvassing 
close to Election Day works best. Volunteer phone-banking produces variable but often 
substantial effects. Robotic phone calls are ineffective, even when from a trusted source. And 
direct mail, whether in the form of postcards, handwritten notes, or voter guides, has relatively 
weak effects. The evaluation also discerned promising new insights meriting further study in 
future elections, as noted below.
This report describes evaluation fi ndings from the fi rst two election cycles covered by the 
California Votes Initiative, based on outreach conducted prior to the June 2006, November 2006 
and, in one case, March 2007 elections. A future report will incorporate summarized fi ndings 
from the 2008 election cycles as well. 
Topics for Further Study
Through a second phase of outreach and evaluation during the 2008 election cycles, the 
Initiative aims to explore the following topics pertaining to voter mobilization for key communities.
• Effectiveness of second-round contacts with people who have expressed 
a commitment to vote during fi rst-round contacts
• Impact of using local volunteers 
• Effectiveness of outreach strategies relative to voter age and language utilized 
in outreach communications
• Differences in using information-rich versus basic outreach messages
• Differences associated with qualitative campaign elements, e.g., canvasser training
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Activists and everyday citizens alike have noted with dismay the low rates of participation in 
American elections. Voter participation is particularly low among racial and ethnic minority 
groups, including African Americans, Asians and Latinos. 
Testing Voter Mobilization
In the past decade, an increasing number of scholars have turned to fi eld research with 
these populations in order to determine how best to increase turnout among low-propensity 
voters.1 Most of these studies have been conducted by academics working with student volunteers.2 
However, as knowledge of the scientifi c and practical benefi ts of fi eld experimentation has spread, 
an increasing number of community organizations have collaborated with academics in designing 
their experiments, allowing researchers to examine the effectiveness of these “real world,” 
community-based efforts.3
Previous fi eld experiments have made great strides in recent years in terms of developing 
a list of best practices for mobilizing low-propensity voters. Dozens of experiments indicate that 
door-to-door canvassing is the most powerful method of turning out voters; phone calls from 
volunteer phone banks can also signifi cantly increase turnout. Mailers, robotic calls and other 
indirect methods tend to be ineffective. Experiments also suggest that the quality of a canvassing 
or phone-banking campaign — the sincerity and commitment of those who make contact with 
voters — is crucial to its success. 
More than one hundred fi eld experiments in voter mobilization have been conducted since 
2000,4 but very few of these experiments have focused specifi cally on ethnic communities. While 
it may be tempting to assume that fi ndings with general populations can be generalized to ethnic 
communities, research shows that approaches effective with Anglos (non-Latino whites) will not 
necessarily work for African Americans, Latinos and Asians.5 
1 Gerber and Green (2000).
2 Examples: Matland and Murray (2005); Michelson (2003), (2005), (2006a); Trivedi (2005), Wong (2005).
3 Green, Gerber, and Nickerson (2003); Green and Michelson (2007); Ramírez (2005); Michelson (2006b); Nickerson (2007).
4 Gerber and Green launched the subfi eld.
5 Robert Putnam’s exploration of social capital and interpersonal networks, for example, has been supplemented by other research showing that 
these dynamics operate differently in ethnic communities: Putnam (1995), (2000); García Bedolla (2005); Harris (1999); Chávez, Wampler 
and Burkhart (2006).
The Starting Point
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Past Experiments by Voter Ethnicity
Prior to The James Irvine Foundation launch of the California Votes Initiative, a limited 
number of voter mobilization fi eld experiments had been conducted among ethnic communities. 
Following is a summary of the fi ndings of the experiments published to date. 
Personal contact has been effective with African American voters
An effort to increase African American turnout in the November 2000 elections using 
direct mail and commercial phone banks did not have a clear impact on voter turnout.6 Three 
door-to-door canvassing efforts targeting African Americans were conducted by the Association 
of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) in November 2001 and November 
2003.7 Results varied across settings, but these experiments all had large and statistically signifi cant 
impacts on turnout, demonstrating that personal contact seems to be an effective method to increase 
African American voter turnout in local elections, a fi nding consistent with other populations.
Phone calls and postcards have resulted in modest South and East Asian voter turnout gains
For the November 2002 elections, one effort used live telephone calls and postcards to 
mobilize East Asian and South Asian registered voters, which resulted in modest turnout gains, 
a 2.2 percentage-point increase in turnout among those individuals who received a telephone call 
and a 1.3 percentage-point gain among those who received 
a postcard.8 Another fi eld experiment reaching out to South 
Asian voters (Hindu and Sikh Indian Americans) prior to the 
November 2004 elections used English-language postcards, 
with varying messages designed to make ethnic or civic 
identities salient.9 The difference between turnout among 
those in the treatment group and those in the control group 
was not statistically signifi cant.10 
Latino voter turnout has been increased by canvassers of shared race/ethnicity, live bilingual calls 
and follow-up contact
Field experiments targeting Latino voters are somewhat more common. In 2001, a 
nonpartisan door-to-door canvassing experiment aimed to increase turnout in a school board 
election in the majority-Latino rural town of Dos Palos, California.11 Although both Latinos and 
non-Latinos of all party affi liations were targeted, turnout increased only among Latino Democrats, 
suggesting a relationship to the ethnicity and partisanship of the canvassers (all of whom were 
 A limited number of experiments 
focused on voter mobilization among 
ethnic groups has generated some data 
regarding successful techniques.
6 Green (2004b).
7 Green and Michelson (2007).
8 Wong (2005).
9 Trivedi (2005).
10 While they did not result in large turnout gains, these experiments showed the feasibility of multilanguage efforts, demonstrating that 
surnames could successfully be used to sort Asian registered voters into national-origin subgroups for language-specifi c targeting.
11 Michelson (2003).
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Latino Democrats). A similar 2002 experiment in Fresno, California expanded on these fi ndings 
by using canvassers of all races and ethnicities, targeting Latino youth participation in the state’s 
gubernatorial election. This effort found that Latino canvassers were more effective at reaching 
Latino voters than were non-Latino canvassers.12 A six-city effort by the National Association of 
Latino Elected and Appointed Offi cials (NALEO) in 2002 found that Latino turnout was not 
boosted by robotic calls or direct mail, but that live calls (scripted but conversational messages 
delivered by bilingual staff) increased turnout by 4.6 percentage points.13 A door-to-door campaign 
in Maricopa County, Arizona, conducted by ACORN in November 2003 encouraged Latino 
voters to vote to maintain the county hospital. Those who indicated in an initial round that they 
intended to vote “yes” were targeted to receive a second contact from canvassers. This campaign 
had a large and statistically signifi cant impact, increasing turnout by 12 percentage points among 
contacted voters in one-voter households and 17.6 percentage points in two-voter households.14
12 Michelson (2006a).
13 Ramírez (2005).
14 Michelson (2006b).
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Methodology
The California Votes Initiative evaluation utilized randomly assigned treatment and control groups, allowing for 
robust statistical evaluation of their impact. This research approach begins with the defi nition of a population 
of eligible registered voters in a target area. Individuals are then randomly divided into treatment and control 
groups through the use of a computerized random number generator. 
The mobilization effort then targets all individuals in the treatment group, although for door-to-door and 
telephone efforts, not all individuals in the treatment group can be successfully contacted. After the relevant 
election, turnout rates for the treatment and control groups are compared. All of the experiments described 
here, including those in the California Votes Initiative, consult public records of voting history rather than 
asking individuals to recall this information. The difference in voting rates is then subjected to statistical 
analysis, taking into account both the contact rate (the number of individuals in the treatment group 
successfully contacted) and prior voting history for each individual. Efforts are evaluated using a standard 
95 percent confi dence level, meaning that researchers are 95 percent confi dent that the statistical estimates 
resulting from the analysis are accurate. Results that fall below this 95 percent confi dence level may be 
suggestive (particularly as they approach the 95 percent level), but they are not considered reliable.
For each get-out-the-vote campaign involved in the California Votes Initiative, evaluators examine 
“intent-to-treat effects” (the differences in turnout between the treatment groups and the control groups), 
as well as “treatment-on-treated” effects (the effect of the treatment on those who actually received it). 
The distinction arises in those cases where only some citizens assigned to the treatment group are actually 
contacted.15 Comparing turnout among those actually contacted to those not contacted (both those in the 
control group and the portion of the treatment group whom were never reached) misestimates the effect 
of the outreach effort because some individuals are simply easier to contact and, potentially, are more likely 
to turn out to vote. In other words, it is not simply random that some voters in the treatment group are 
contacted and others are not.16 In order to avoid drawing biased inferences, we compute a treatment effect 
by employing two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, using “contact” as an explanatory variable and 
“assignment to the treatment group” as an instrumental variable. This estimator is equivalent to dividing 
the intent-to-treat effect by the contact rate (the proportion of the treatment group that was contacted).17
15 Contacts are defi ned as the canvassers actually speaking with the targeted voter personally and delivering the intended mobilization message. 
Messages left on answering machines or with other members of the household (either by telephone or in person) do not qualify as contacts.
16 Arceneaux, Gerber, and Green (2006).
17 As explained in Gerber and Green (2000).
Initiative Design
In order to approach answers to outstanding questions about effective outreach methods and, in 
the process, improve voting rates within California’s low-income and ethnic communities, The James 
Irvine Foundation began early implementation of the California Votes Initiative in January 2006. 
The Initiative was designed with a number of characteristics that allow for a robust 
assessment of the effectiveness of various outreach strategies among various communities: 
• Outreach projects are designed upfront to incorporate an experimental evaluation approach
• A diverse array of organizations and communities are involved 
• A three-year time period of voter outreach (2006 to 2008) permits the evaluation to occur 
over multiple election cycles 
Initiative Overview
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Outreach Organizations
Asian Pacifi c American Legal Center APALC
California Public Interest Research Group CALPIRG 
Center for Community Action 
and Environmental Justice CCAEJ
Central American Resource Center CARECEN
National Association of Latino Elected 
and Appointed Offi cials NALEO
Orange County Asian Pacifi c Islander 
Community Alliance OCAPICA
Pacifi c Institute for Community Organization PICO
Southwest Voter Registration Education Project SVREP
Strategic Concepts in 
Organizing and Policy Education SCOPE
Geographic Outreach Areas
Los Angeles County
Los Angeles County
Riverside and San Bernardino counties
Los Angeles County
Fresno, Kern, Los Angeles, Orange, 
Riverside and San Bernardino counties
Orange, Riverside and San Bernardino counties
San Joaquin Valley; Los Angeles, Orange, 
Riverside and San Bernardino counties
Los Angeles, Riverside and San Bernardino counties
Los Angeles County
Initiative Participation
In the weeks prior to the June 2006 primary elections and the November 2006 midterm 
elections, Irvine worked with a number of community organizations in California to increase turnout 
among low-propensity voters, primarily within low- and moderate-income ethnic communities. 
All of the community organization efforts were funded by Irvine, and funded groups were 
encouraged to participate in an experimental evaluation of their efforts. In consultation with the 
evaluation team, the community organizations planned their own preferred form of voter mobilization, 
including leafl eting, direct mail, robotic calls, live phone calls and door-to-door canvassing. 
The grantees and evaluation team determined jointly which efforts were most conducive 
to experimental evaluation and thus, not all aspects of their outreach efforts were assessed. One 
grantee, California Public Interest Research Group, conducted considerable outreach activities at 
college campuses; however, due to the limitations concerning the number of campuses on which 
the work was conducted, the outreach could not be evaluated utilizing the experimental evaluation 
design. This organization’s 2008 outreach efforts will be evaluated.
Evaluation Team
Melissa R. Michelson, California State University, East Bay
Lisa García Bedolla, University of California, Irvine
Donald P. Green, Yale University
Research assistance was provided by Jedediah Alfaro-Smith, Jackie Filla, Jennifer Hernández, Michael 
Jackson, Maggie McConnell, Ricardo Ramírez and Betsy Sinclair.
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The remainder of this paper is dedicated to summarizing the effectiveness of each group’s outreach 
campaign and sharing implications of the fi ndings for future nonpartisan voter mobilization efforts.
Among the mobilization tactics studied, effectiveness varied considerably, with some proving 
ineffective and others profoundly infl uencing the voting rates among those targeted. It should be noted 
that any given experiment’s results are subject to sampling fl uctuation. Thus, when reviewing several 
dozen experiments, it is not unusual to encounter negative results. Such fi ndings can be expected as 
a matter of chance. In this study, occasional negative effect estimates are interpreted to mean that 
intervention simply had no positive effect on turnout. Table 1 provides an overview of the various 
outreach campaigns.
March 2007 experiments
Live and robotic calls to Latino voters in 
the city of Los Angeles, with robotic 
calls used to screen numbers for live 
phone banking
November 2006 experiments
Similar campaign, but with nine Asian 
national-origin groups and an imbedded 
message-effect experiment
Door-to-door in Riverside and San 
Bernardino Counties with pledge cards; 
election weekend follow-ups with polling 
place information ﬂyers and Election Day 
door hangers
Door-to-door canvassing and live phone 
banking in same community with voter 
pledge cards mailed back to voters 
showing polling place information and 
election weekend follow-up contacts 
(both door-to-door and by telephone)
Live and robotic calls to same 
community, with robotic calls used to 
screen numbers for live phone banking
Live phone banking and mailers in 
English and relevant language to three 
Asian national-origin groups in Orange 
County
Variety of small-scale outreach efforts 
throughout the state, with focus on 
personal tactics (door-to-door and live 
phone banking), as well as the use of 
multiple contacts
Door-to-door canvassing, live phone 
banking and mailers to Latino voters in 
ﬁve communities in Los Angeles, with a 
focus on telephone calls and reminder 
calls to those expressing an intention to 
vote in initial contacts
Door-to-door in South Central Los 
Angeles, with some voters targeted for 
second contact
June 2006 experiments
Live phone banking and mailers in 
English and relevant language to six 
Asian national-origin groups in Los 
Angeles County
Door-to-door in Mira Loma/Glen Avon 
community of Riverside County with 
pledge cards and Election Day door 
hangers
Door-to-door canvassing and live phone 
banking of Latino voters in Pico 
Union/Westlake community of Los 
Angeles, starting several months before 
the election
Live and robotic calls to Latino voters in 
Fresno, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside 
and San Bernardino counties
n/a
Variety of small-scale efforts throughout 
the state, including two live phone 
banking efforts; focus on indirect 
efforts such as mailers, leaﬂets 
and robotic calls
n/a
Door-to-door in South Central 
Los Angeles
APALC
CCAEJ
CARECEN
NALEO
OCAPICA
PICO
SVREP
SCOPE
Table 1. Road Map to the California Votes Initiative Experiments 
Individual Outreach Campaign Results
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Asian Pacifi c American Legal Center
Asian Pacifi c American Legal Center (APALC) was founded in 1983 and has long worked 
in Southern California to advance Asian Pacifi c American civil rights, provide legal services and 
education, and achieve a more equitable society. While APALC is the nation’s largest organization 
to focus on the legal needs of the Asian Pacifi c Islander community, it had not conducted a voter 
mobilization campaign prior to the June 2006 election.
As part of the California Votes Initiative, APALC ran a campaign that consisted of making 
phone calls and sending direct mail to a variety of Asian national-origin groups. The organization 
conducted a phone banking campaign for the June 2006 primary in California from May 18 to 
June 5, from 5 to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 1 to 5 p.m. on weekends. Bilingual interviewers were 
used to allow for in-language mobilization of the included national-origin groups, including 
South Asian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese.18 
In addition to the phone banking campaign, APALC held a press conference prior to 
each election to explain and publicize the get-out-the-vote campaign. Press conferences were well 
attended, particularly by the ethnic media. Prior to the November 2006 election, APALC held 
seven focus groups in order to help refi ne its get-out-the-vote messages.
The pool of experiment subjects was culled from the Los Angeles County Registrar’s list 
of registered voters as of April 1, 2006. Asian individuals were identifi ed based on place of birth 
and full names. APALC used internal ethnic name lists to determine 
the particular Asian ethnic background of each individual. The fi le 
was further culled to include only low-propensity voters, defi ned as those 
who had voted in fewer than two of the last four major elections, 
were younger than 25, or were newly registered. The list of names 
was then narrowed to only include individuals residing in geographic 
areas with large numbers of Asian voters. The remaining list of about 
110,000 individuals was cleaned by a commercial vendor to include only those with valid mailing 
addresses and phone numbers, resulting in a pool of 43,875 registered voters that was then 
randomly divided into treatment and control groups. 
Prior to the June 2006 primary election, APALC called approximately 9,000 registered 
voters and sent bilingual mailers to approximately 11,000 registered voters. Groups of registered 
voters on the APALC list were selected randomly to receive a phone call, a mailer, or both. Phone 
calls were conducted in cooperation with eight other local Asian Pacifi c Islander organizations. 
The same get-out-the-vote message was used for all ethnic groups: “Voting empowers our 
communities and is easy.” Mailers included general information about the candidates and measures 
on the ballot, the voter’s polling place and the right of “decline-to-state” voters (those who declined 
to declare a political party affi liation) to request partisan ballots. Translation was provided by 
the relevant partner organizations, and the photos were customized for appropriateness to each 
national-origin group.
18 Although APALC also worked to mobilize Cambodians, the number of registered voters in this group was too small to allow for a ﬁ eld experiment.
 APALC’s mailers had weak 
effects on voter turnout, 
but its phone banking efforts 
were more successful.
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As Table 2 indicates, APALC’s mailers had weak effects on voter turnout, but its phone 
banking efforts were more successful. With the exception of Vietnamese Americans, turnout was 
higher in the treatment groups than in the control groups.
Table 3 reports the corresponding treatment-on-treated effects. Combining all national-origin 
groups, 2SLS analysis reveals that turnout among those who received a phone call was 2.5 percentage 
points higher than the control group.19 Given the population’s base voting rate of 8.4 percent, this 
is actually a substantial effect. To raise a group’s turnout from 8.4 percent to 10.9 percent represents 
a 30 percent relative gain in votes. The effort was most effective among South Asians (4.8 percentage 
point increase in turnout), Japanese Americans (3.1 percentage points) and Filipino Americans 
(6.9 percentage points). While these differences are close to statistically signifi cant, the differences 
observed across groups are not.
During the November 2006 campaign, APALC attempted to make contact with approximately 
18,700 voters, including attempted calls to 12,000 voters and mailers to 10,900 voters (some voters 
were targeted to receive both a call and a mailer). Phone bankers made bilingual calls in nine 
languages and dialects, including English, Khmer, Mandarin, Cantonese, Hindi, Tagalog, Japanese, 
Korean and Vietnamese. In-language mailers were sent to targeted Chinese American, Korean 
American and Vietnamese American voters. The get-out-the-vote message used in these contacts 
was developed using the results of a series of seven focus groups conducted by APALC and its 
partner organizations in the months prior to the campaign. 
19 Slightly more signifi cant than the results achieved by Wong (2005).
   
 
South Asian
N=1,520
Chinese
N=18,061
Filipino
N=5,328
Japanese
N=2,774
Korean
N=8,930
Vietnamese
N=5,660
Phone call 
contact rate
29.8%
19.3%
20.2%
33.8%
27.6%
13.6%
 
Control group 
turnout rate 
6.3%
(1,101)
8.0%
(12,076)
9.2%
(3,298)
12.4%
(2,162)
7.6%
(5,386)
8.2%
(3,829)
 
Phone call treatment 
group turnout rate
7.4%
(419)
8.4%
(956)
10.5%
(631)
13.6%
(612)
8.1%
(1,113)
7.0%
(213)
 
Mailer treatment 
group turnout rate
n/a
8.2%
(3,408)
8.3%
(576)
n/a
7.9%
(994)
7.8%
(1,294)
 
Phone call and 
mailer treatment 
group turnout rate 
n/a
8.8%
(1,621)
9.5%
(823)
n/a
8.2%
(1,437)
6.2%
(324)
 
Table 2. Contact Rates and Turnout Rates for APALC Campaign, June 2006 Election
Number of observations in parentheses.
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The target population for the November campaign consisted of registered voters sharing 
three characteristics: 1) surnames implied Asian ancestry, 2) deemed to be low-propensity voters, 
3) resided in geographic areas with large numbers of Asian voters. The resulting subset of the 
voter registration list of 132,563 voters was sent to a commercial vendor to identify individuals 
with valid mailing addresses and phone numbers. This procedure yielded 33,457 voters for 
assignment to treatment and control groups.
The content of the phone bank scripts was nonpartisan. Using feedback from its focus 
groups, APALC decided to compare the effects of two messages for each ethnic group (except 
Japanese American and Vietnamese American voters, for whom only the universal message was 
used).20 Call scripts featured either the universal message which emphasized that “voting empowers 
our community” or an alternate message that was specifi c to each ethnic group depending on the 
responses of focus group participants of the same ethnicity. Voters in each ethnic group (except 
Japanese and Vietnamese) were divided into either a universal treatment group or an alternate 
treatment group, and each group was called using the appropriate script.
Callers also informed interested voters about their polling location and gave them other 
basic Election Day information, such as polling place hours and the availability of translated 
materials. Scripts included ethnic-specifi c hotline numbers that voters could call for assistance. 
Additionally, the scripts listed common reasons for not voting that individuals might give 
   
 
All
South Asian
Chinese
Filipino
Japanese
Korean
Vietnamese
Pooled
N
43,397
1,520
18,061
5,328
2,774
8,930
5,660
 
2SLS phone no 
covariates
2.6
(1.6)
3.8
(4.9)
2.7
(3.2)
5.9
(4.8)
3.4
(4.6)
1.3
(2.5)
-10.7
(8.9)
2.3+
(1.6)
2SLS mail no 
covariates
-0.05
(0.3)
n/a
0.3
(0.5)
-0.9
(1.0)
n/a
0.2
(0.7)
-0.4
(0.8)
0.01
(0.3)
 
2SLS phone with 
covariates
2.9+
(1.6)
4.8
(4.9)
2.8
(3.2)
6.9
(4.8)
3.1
(4.5)
1.5
(2.4)
-10.5
(8.7)
2.5+
(1.5)
2SLS mail with 
covariates
0.01
(0.3)
n/a
0.4
(0.5)
-0.8
(1.0)
n/a
0.2
(0.7)
-0.3
(0.8)
0.09
(0.3)
Table 3. Treatment-on-Treated Effects for APALC Campaign, June 2006 Election
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates obtained by regressing vote on phone contact and mail, using assignment to phone calls and mail as instrumental 
variables. Covariates include voter history for four previous statewide elections. + = p<.10. The subgroup numbers do not add up to the total because some 
individuals are missing national-origin information.
20 Outreach coordinators decided not to divide up the message for these two groups because the relatively small size of their lists for those 
national-origin groups made it unlikely that we would fi nd a statistically discernible difference from the messaging.
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(for example, voting is inconvenient), followed by appropriate caller responses. The phone bank 
ran almost daily from October 18 until November 6 at APALC’s offi ce. The hours of phone 
banking were 5 to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 1 to 5 p.m. on weekends. 
As during the June outreach, in November 2006 APALC experimented with mailings sent 
to targeted voters. In contrast to the June campaign, APALC’s November mailings included Easy 
Voter Guides that were sent either in-language (for Chinese American, Korean American and 
Vietnamese American voters) or in English. To determine which language materials to send to 
a voter, APALC used age and place of birth information to predict voters’ English profi ciency. 
English versions of the guide were sent to voters who were either U.S.- or foreign-born and 35 
years or younger. Translated versions were sent to Chinese, Korean, or Vietnamese voters who 
were foreign-born and more than 35 years old. If place of birth information was not available in 
the voter fi le, as was the case for many individuals, it was assumed that the voter was foreign-born, 
and the language of outreach was determined based on age. APALC sent English versions of the 
guides to Cambodian, Filipino, Japanese and South Asian American voters. APALC and its partner 
organizations prepared bilingual labels that were attached to the front cover of the guides. The label 
identifi ed the organizations participating in the project to let voters know who was sending them 
the guides, listed a phone number to call if the voters had questions, and provided a link to the 
Easy Voter Guide Web site so that voters could download English and/or translated versions 
of the guide. The guides were mailed between October 16 and October 23, arriving between 
October 20 and 31, within two weeks of Election Day.
In preparing to carry out the campaign, 33,457 low-propensity Asian Pacifi c Islander voters 
residing in targeted geographic areas with valid mailing addresses and phone numbers were 
randomly assigned to one of four groups: 7,858 were to receive a phone call only; 6,775 were to 
receive a mailer only; 4,106 were to receive both a phone call and mailer; and the remaining 14,718 
were to receive neither a phone call nor mailer. Of the 11,964 voters to receive a phone call, 501 
were Cambodian, 4,057 were Chinese, 2,053 were Filipino, 
1,124 were Japanese, 2,619 were Korean, 1,038 were South 
Asian, and 572 were Vietnamese. In an attempt to reach 
these voters, 30,236 calls were placed, including 1,077 to 
Cambodian registered voters, 9,561 to Chinese registered 
voters, 6,051 to Filipino registered voters, 3,180 to Japanese 
registered voters, 5,809 to Korean registered voters, 2,519 to 
South Asian registered voters, and 1,525 to Vietnamese registered voters. (The subgroup numbers 
do not add up to the total because some individuals are missing national-origin information.)
Table 4 shows the breakdown of results for each experimental group and target population, 
illustrating the so-called intent-to-treat effects (the raw turnout rates for each of the randomly 
assigned experimental groups). By and large, the effects were positive. Table 5 shows effects of 
the mailings and of actual (as opposed to intended) contact by phone canvassers. Again, the 
estimated effects were mostly positive, but there was also considerable sampling variance for each 
of the national-origin groups. The pooled results indicate that the phone bank produced an increase 
 The phone bank produced an increase 
in turnout of 3.7 percentage points, 
while the Easy Voter Guides did not 
have a statistically signifi cant effect.
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in turnout of 3.7 percentage points (with a standard error of 1.4), while the Easy Voter Guides 
did not have a statistically signifi cant effect. Table 6 shows that the two phone banking scripts were 
similarly effective, in keeping with several previous phone banking experiments that have found 
negligible differences in the effectiveness of ethnic versus universalistic nonpartisan appeals. 
   
 
South Asian
N=1,588
Cambodian
N=581
Chinese
N=14,497
Filipino
N=4,186
Japanese
N=2,554
Korean
N=5,984
Vietnamese
N=3,894
Phone call 
contact rate
35.7%
26.9%
36.3%
29.9%
34.4%
39.1%
39.5%
 
Control group 
turnout rate 
29.9%
(271)
12.5%
(40)
25.7%
(7,618)
32.9%
(1,520)
37.1%
(1,138)
28.5%
(1,999)
23.1%
(1,947)
Phone call treatment 
group turnout rate
33.0%
(542)
17.4%
(242)
26.7%
(2,889)
34.6%
(1,457)
35.4%
(804)
29.3%
(1,521)
25.7%
(342)
Mailer treatment 
group turnout rate
40.2%
(276)
5.0%
(40)
27.8%
(2,741)
33.2%
(596)
33.6%
(387)
28.0%
(1,338)
24.8%
(1,349)
Phone call and 
mailer treatment 
group turnout rate 
34.2%
(486)
21.4%
(257)
27.3%
(1,137)
34.9%
(585)
39.6%
(316)
30.8%
(1,069)
22.2%
(225)
Table 4. Contact Rates and Turnout Rates for APALC Campaign, November 2006 Election
Number of observations in parentheses.
   
 
All
South Asian
Cambodian
Chinese
Filipino
Japanese
Korean
Vietnamese
Pooled
N
33,204
1,575
579
14,385
4,158
2,545
5,927
3,863
 
2SLS phone no 
covariates
2.6
(1.6)
-3.9
(8.2)
  39.6*
(14.9)
1.4
(2.3)
5.7
(5.2)
1.4
(5.7)
4.1
(3.2)
1.5
(4.9)
  2.7*
(1.6)
2SLS mail no 
covariates
 1.2*
(0.5)
  4.2+
(2.5)
3.8
(3.5)
 1.6+
(0.8)
0.4
(1.6)
-0.1
(2.1)
0.5
(1.2)
0.9
(1.4)
  1.2*
(0.5)
 
2SLS phone with 
covariates
  3.7*
(1.5)
1.2
(7.3)
  43.6*
(14.3)
2.6
(2.1)
7.3
(4.9)
1.9
(5.3)
4.2
(3.0)
2.6
(4.4)
  3.7*
(1.4)
2SLS mail with 
covariates
0.6
(0.5)
  4.7*
(2.3)
4.3
(3.3)
0.8
(0.8)
-0.05
(1.5)
-1.2
(2.0)
-0.02
(1.1)
0.7
(1.3)
0.7+
(0.5)
Table 5. Treatment-on-Treated Effects for APALC Campaign, November 2006 Election
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates obtained by regressing vote on phone contact and mail, using assignment to phone calls and mail as 
instrumental variables. Covariates include voter history for fi ve previous statewide elections. + = p<.10, * = p<.05. The subgroup numbers do not 
add up to the total because some individuals are missing national-origin information.
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Voter turnout among those contacted Voter turnout among those assigned to be called   
 
South Asian
Cambodian
Chinese
Filipino
Japanese
Korean
Vietnamese
Universal appeal
43.2%
(185)
28.6%
(70)
35.4%
(724)
45.5%
(330)
47.4%
(386)
41.2%
(505)
32.6%
(224)
Ethnic appeal
42.1%
(183)
29.7%
(64)
36.0%
(742)
47.8%
(278)
n/a
42.8%
(514)
n/a
Control
29.9%
(271)
12.5%
(40)
25.7%
(7,618)
32.9%
(1,520)
37.1%
(1,038)
28.5%
(1,999)
23.1%
(1,947)
Universal appeal
33.6%
(533)
18.7%
(273)
27.2%
(2,053)
35.1%
(1,045)
36.6%
(1,120)
30.0%
(1,302)
24.3%
(567)
Ethnic appeal
33.5%
(495)
20.4%
(226)
26.4%
(1,973)
34.2%
(997)
n/a
29.9%
(1,288)
n/a
Table 6. Turnout Rates for Alternative Phone Scripts for APALC Campaign, November 2006 Election
None of the comparisons between phone script conditions is signifi cant at the p<.05 level. Controls exclude the mail-only experimental group.
Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice
For the June 2006 election, the Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice 
(CCAEJ) targeted four precincts in the rural communities of Mira Loma/Glen Avon in Riverside 
County. Although CCAEJ had never before conducted get-out-the-vote activities, the organization 
has been active working on environmental justice issues in this neighborhood for 25 years, with 
the help of a number of established community outreach (promotora) volunteers. Because of the low 
concentration of registered voters in this largely Latino and African American community, CCAEJ 
cast the net widely: The pool of registered voters included in the experiment included all new 
registrants and all voters who had voted in at least one of the previous fi ve major elections. 
All of the canvassers were residents of the fi ve targeted precincts. Canvassers encountered 
numerous challenges in their attempts to reach voters due to the distance between homes with 
registered voters, gated communities, guard dogs and a general lack of sidewalks. Nevertheless, 
one-fourth (24.5 percent) of those assigned to the treatment group were successfully contacted.
Those contacted were asked to sign a pledge card promising participation in the upcoming 
election. They were also asked several short survey questions, including questions about their level 
of satisfaction with elected offi cials and their opinion of the most important public issue in their 
community (for example, jobs, health care, the environment). Voters were given packets from 
the canvassers that reinforced the get-out-the-vote message. At 5 a.m. on Election Day, volunteers 
began distributing door hangers at the residences of all successfully contacted voters, reminding 
them to vote. This resulted in a few secondary face-to-face contacts as residents encountered the 
volunteers at their doorsteps; however, the number of such contacts was not recorded. 
I N S I G H T  N E W  E X P E R I M E N T S  I N  M I N O R I T Y  V O T E R  M O B I L I Z A T I O N
P A G E  1 7  |  T H E  J A M E S  I R V I N E  F O U N D A T I O N
In the fi ve targeted precincts, turnout among those randomly assigned to the control group 
was 11.1 percent, as compared to 19.6 percent among those randomly assigned to the treatment 
group (Table 7). This 8.5 percentage-point difference (the intent-to-treat effect) is both substantively 
large and statistically signifi cant at the .001 level. Of those targeted, 19.7 percent were successfully 
contacted. Dividing the intent-to-treat estimate by the contact rate provides an estimate of actual 
face-to-face contact of 43.1 percentage points, with a robust cluster standard error of 12.5 percentage 
points. In other words, when CCAEJ canvassers actually contacted a person on the target list, 
they increased his/her probability of voting from 11.1 percent to 54.2 percent — among the largest 
estimated treatment effects to emerge from a voter mobilization fi eld experiment. This estimate 
comes down to a still-impressive 33.6 percent (SE = 11.7) when controls are added for the precinct 
of residence, ethnicity and voting history in the four previous elections.
For the November 2006 campaign, CCAEJ expanded its pilot project from June 2006 
to include a much larger group of targeted voters and extended its mobilization campaign into 
a second county (San Bernardino). Many canvassers were new to get-out-the-vote activities, but 
had relationships with precinct residents: 84 percent were residents of the targeted precincts. 
The campaign began on October 7 and lasted through Election Day. In that time period, CCAEJ’s 
canvassers contacted 374 voters in Riverside and 1,366 voters in San Bernardino. Canvassers 
provided residents with voter information, including a card delineating their voting rights and 
the voter guide provided by the Secretary of State’s 
offi ce. They asked voters to sign a pledge card and also 
conducted an extensive follow-up during the weekend 
before Election Day and on Election Day itself. During 
the weekend follow-up, canvassers provided voters with 
fl yers reminding them about Election Day and specifying 
their polling place. On Election Day they placed door 
hangers with this information on each voter’s door during 
the morning and canvassed throughout the day.
During the canvassing, individuals contacted in San Bernardino County were asked to 
identify the issues that they were most concerned about. They most frequently expressed concerns 
about public safety, health care and education. As none of these issues was addressed directly 
on the November 2006 ballot, canvassers responded by encouraging residents to stay involved, 
    
Treatment group (N=1,431)
  
Control group (N=350)  
Contact rate
19.7%
n/a
 
Turnout rate
19.6%
11.1%
 
Table 7. Contact Rates and Turnout Rates for CCAEJ Campaign, June 2006 Election
 When canvassers contacted a person, 
they increased his/her probability 
of voting from 11.1 percent to 
54.2 percent — among the largest 
estimated treatment effects to 
emerge from a voter mobilization 
fi eld experiment.
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organize and ensure that their issues were represented in future elections. In the weeks before 
the election, CCAEJ held a number of community meetings to help residents analyze ballot 
issues, discuss the importance of the upcoming election, the importance of voting, the various 
propositions and measures, and their concerns about local measures. CCAEJ also helped to 
sponsor a well-attended candidates forum bringing together all San Bernardino City Unifi ed 
School Board candidates.
Because CCAEJ addressed only a portion of the initial areas slated for canvassing, analysis 
was pared down to this geographic subset of 28 precincts, comprising a total of 9,586 voters. 
Of the 7,209 target voters assigned to the treatment group, 24 percent were actually contacted 
by canvassers. As shown in Table 8, applying 2SLS to each precinct separately (in light of 
precinct variation in contact rates and disturbance variances), the average treatment effect is 6.9 
percentage points with a standard error of 4.1 percentage points.21 The average treatment effect of 
6.9 percentage points is close to the 7-point effect typical of door-to-door canvassing campaigns. 
The speculated difference in effectiveness between CCAEJ’s June and November efforts refl ects 
the operational challenge of scaling up its canvassing efforts to a substantially larger geographic 
area and of conducting the November mobilization in communities where CCAEJ was not as 
established as an organization and lacked a well-developed volunteer promotora network. 
Central American Resource Center
The Central American Resource Center (CARECEN) conducted phone banking 
and door-to-door mobilization of low-propensity Latino voters in the Pico-Union/Westlake 
community of Los Angeles, an area heavily populated by recent immigrants from Mexico 
and Central America, particularly from Guatemala and El Salvador. CARECEN had experience 
with get-out-the-vote prior to its involvement in the California Votes Initiative, having worked 
to increase local voter turnout in the March and May 2005 Los Angeles mayoral contests. 
Pooled 2SLS results 
across precincts
6.9
(4.1)
2SLS with precinct controls, 
past voting controls, and 
precinct x treatment 
assignment interactions in 
ﬁrst-stage equation
4.9
(4.1)
2SLS with precinct controls
2.8
(6.0)
2SLS
4.3
(6.0)
Table 8. Treatment-on-Treated Effects for CCAEJ Campaign, November 2006 Election
Robust cluster standard errors in parentheses.
21 Evaluators also looked for evidence of differential effectiveness across the 28 precincts and found little (chi-squared with 27 degrees 
of freedom = 32.3, p =.22).
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For the June 2006 campaign, CARECEN targeted voters living in the Pico-Union 
neighborhood who were Latino (identifi ed by surname) and who either had registered since 
the last statewide election or had voted in three or fewer of the last four statewide elections. Phone 
calls targeted just the subset of voters whose phone numbers were listed in their voter registration 
information. The mobilization effort began several months prior to the election. Door-to-door 
canvassing and phone banking activities were performed four times a week with a weekly average 
of 14 hours in the fi eld, weekdays from 5 to 8 p.m. and weekends from 4 to 7 p.m. Canvassers 
encountered some diffi culty reaching targeted voters on their walk lists due to locked gates and 
other barriers to entry in this particular geographic area. Nevertheless, contact rates for both efforts 
were noteworthy: 43.9 percent for the door-to-door effort and 30.7 percent for the phone effort.22 
Fully 48 percent of individuals targeted for door-to-door visits were contacted before May 1; 
72 percent were contacted more than three weeks prior to Election Day. 
Comparing turnout rates among those in the treatment groups to those in the control 
groups, however, reveals that the CARECEN mobilization effort was only moderately successful 
in terms of turning people out to vote. Table 9 reports that among those living in households 
with unknown phone numbers, turnout was 
14.5 percent for those in the door-to-door canvassing 
treatment group, compared to 14.3 percent in the 
corresponding control group. These fi gures imply 
a treatment-on-treated effect of approximately 
1.0 percentage point, but the difference is not 
statistically signifi cant. Mobilization effects were 
somewhat stronger among those with known phone 
numbers. Turnout was 21.7 percent for people assigned to the control group, 22.0 percent 
among those who were targeted to receive only door-to-door contact, 22.4 percent for those 
assigned to receive a call, and 23.1 percent for those targeted to receive both a phone call and 
a door-to-door visit. Applying 2SLS to these fi gures generates estimated canvassing effects of 
0.6 percentage points (clustered SE = 4.9) among those with unknown phone numbers and 
1.0 percentage points (clustered SE = 2.6) among those with known phone numbers. The 
estimated effect of a phone contact in the latter group is 3.3 percentage points but with a 
standard error of 4.7 percentage points. Given the large standard errors, it is diffi cult to say 
which treatment was more effective. However, the pooled estimate of the canvassing effect 
(b = 0.9, SE = 2.7) is clearly disappointing because the implied 95 percent confi dence interval 
does not include 7 percentage points, which is what previous experimental studies of canvassing 
suggest is the expected effect.
 Mobilization effects were somewhat 
stronger among those with known phone 
numbers. Turnout was 23.1 percent for 
those targeted to receive both a phone 
call and a door-to-door visit.
22 CARECEN used primarily monolingual Spanish speakers to conduct its June election mobilization effort; as a result, individuals on the treatment 
list who were monolingual-English were often not successfully contacted. The extent to which the contact rate was affected by this limitation 
of the mobilization effort is unknown.
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One explanation for the small impact of CARECEN’s efforts in June 2006 is that the 
organization’s early presence in the fi eld gave contacted voters time to forget that they had 
been contacted. For the November 2006 campaign, CARECEN shifted its strategy to involve 
repeated contacts on a smaller treatment group over a shorter period of time in the fi eld. These 
changes were expected to enhance CARECEN’s effectiveness at increasing turnout. In addition, 
the November effort incorporated a follow-up voter pledge card and door-to-door and Election 
Day telephone reminders. During the door-to-door visits, voters were asked to write their 
names and addresses on voter pledge cards; these postcards were then mailed back to the voters 
a week before Election Day, with polling place information specifi c to the individual voter. 
Postcard recipients were not randomly assigned; all voters reached door-to-door were asked 
to complete them. Thus, the estimated effect of the experimental treatment represents the 
combined effect of the door-to-door appeal, the leafl ets that canvassers distributed to voters, 
and the follow-up postcard.
In addition, CARECEN held several weekly voter education sessions and a voter forum 
on November 4 to discuss the mechanics of voting and various ballot initiatives. Representatives 
from CARECEN gave interviews to various media outlets that led to television, radio and 
newspaper coverage by both English-language and Spanish-language outlets before the election. 
News stories featured the canvassing campaign and the voter forum. 
Latino residents included in the treatment and control groups were new and occasional 
voters.23 During the fi rst round of canvassing, from the last week of September until the third 
week of October 2006, more than 50 percent of voters (N = 2,422) were successfully contacted. 
A total of 1,179 successful contacts were made from the third week of October to the fi rst week 
of November 2006. Canvassers provided voters with Easy Voter Guides to educate them about 
   
 
No valid phone number 
Voted
Contacted by canvassers
N
Valid phone number
Voted
Contacted by canvassers
Contacted by callers
N
  
Canvass and call 
23.1%
45.0%
26.3%
813
Call only 
22.4%
27.5%
657
 
Canvass only 
14.5%
35.8%
771
22.0%
44.2%
1,933
Control 
14.3%
719
21.7%
1,694
Experimental groups
Table 9. Contact Rates and Turnout Rates for CARECEN Campaign, June 2006 Election
23 “Occasional” voters are defi ned as those who voted in one to three of the last fi ve major elections, and “new” voters 
as those who registered after September 2005.
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the election and also spoke with them about the campaign and the importance of voting. 
The Easy Voter Guides contained easy-to-read, nonpartisan information about the candidates 
for statewide offi ce and the statewide ballot measures on the November 2006 ballot, and 
they were available in multiple languages. The guide for November 2006 also provided the 
get-out-the-vote message, “It’s your future. Vote for it!” on the front cover. A few weeks into 
the CARECEN outreach canvassers also began asking voters to sign pledge cards committing 
to vote. On Election Day, CARECEN spoke with 120 voters by phone and visited 673 door 
to door. CARECEN’s overall contact rate of 52.8 percent was a great improvement on the 
organization’s June effort.
Despite gains in the contact rate, results were somewhat disappointing once again, as 
illustrated in Table 10. Turnout in the control group (N = 1,565) was 52.5 percent, as compared 
to 52.2 percent in the treatment group (N = 4,584). Applying 2SLS to each precinct separately 
and pooling the results across precincts (thus controlling for different contact rates across 
precincts) generates a treatment-on-treated estimate of 3.4 percentage points with a standard 
error of 2.9 percentage points (Table 11). Isolating registered voters who had participated 
in at least one prior election, canvasser contact increased turnout by 15.7 percentage points 
(SE = 5.6). By contrast, the effect among those who had not voted prior to 2006 was negligible 
(-0.1 percentage points, SE = 3.1). CARECEN’s overall average effect of 3.4 percent appears 
to refl ect the fact that the latter group is approximately fi ve times larger than the former.
   
 
% contacted
  
% voting
N
Treatment
52.8%
52.2%
4,584
 
Control
52.5%
1,565
 
Experimental groups
Table 10. Contact Rates and Turnout Rates for CARECEN Campaign, November 2006 Election
Pooled 2SLS results 
across precincts
3.4
(2.9)
2SLS with precinct controls 
and precinct x treatment 
assignment interactions in 
ﬁrst-stage equation
2.1
(2.9)
2SLS with precinct controls
-0.1
(3.0)
2SLS
-0.6
(3.0)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 11. Treatment-on-Treated Effects for CARECEN, November 2006 Election
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Overall, CARECEN’s canvassing efforts appeared to be less effective than canvassing 
campaigns conducted by other groups described in this report. One hypothesis suggests that 
this resulted from scripts that did not focus exclusively on the upcoming election. Instead, 
CARECEN’s scripts included information about services provided by the organization, such 
as legal services and education. Canvassers asked contacted voters if they were interested in 
receiving literature from CARECEN about their activities, 
and voters were invited to attend voter education forums 
hosted by CARECEN. In addition, contacted voters were 
asked to name their two top areas of concern for their 
community (for example, jobs, education, health care), 
adding a survey component to the mobilization effort. 
Under these conditions, the voter mobilization message 
may have been diluted and, therefore, less likely to endure between the date of contact and 
the election. Another possibility is that the target population, which included many “habitual 
non-voters,” may have been more diffi cult to mobilize than other low-propensity communities.
National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Offi cials 
National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Offi cials (NALEO) has worked 
since 1981 to increase the political empowerment of Latinos in California and nationwide. In the 
weeks prior to the June and November 2006 elections, NALEO conducted a phone-based voter 
mobilization campaign designed to encourage participation by Latino registered voters living in 
Fresno, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside and San Bernardino counties. In addition to the phone 
banks, NALEO sponsored a bilingual voter information hotline; monitored polling places in 
Los Angeles, Orange County and Riverside to ensure they opened on time; provided assistance in 
the languages required by the Voting Rights Act; and worked with Univision, a Spanish-language 
television station, to produce and air public service announcements promoting the election and 
the information hotline. 
In the weeks prior to the June 2006 election, NALEO partnered with three local community 
organizations in an attempt to contact treatment groups totaling 68,942 individuals. The target 
pool included young voters (ages 18 to 24) who had Spanish surnames, voters newly registered 
since the last major statewide election, and infrequent voters who had participated in only one 
or none of the previous four major elections. Phone banking began on Saturday, May 20, 
and continued through Monday, June 5. Only one phone call was placed to households with 
more than one registered voter in the treatment group; however, successful contacts were defi ned 
narrowly as a live conversation with the intended target individual. In some counties, multi-voter 
households were excluded from the randomized assignment.
 The voter mobilization message may 
have been diluted and, therefore, 
less likely to endure between the 
date of contact and the election.
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Results from the June 2006 campaign were disappointing. Contact rates varied from a 
low of 9.2 percent in Fresno County to a high of 12.4 percent in Los Angeles (Table 12). The 
mobilization effort seems to have failed to move signifi cant numbers of voters to the polls, and 
the low contact rates meant high standard errors and high uncertainty for the estimates of the 
treatment effect. Pooling all fi ve counties yielded an average treatment effect of 2.1 percentage 
points — but a standard error of 2.4 percentage points calls into question whether the mobilization 
effort had any effect at all. 
Based on NALEO’s experience in June 2006, when live callers found it frustrating to call 
non-working numbers, the organization began its fall campaign with a round of robotic calls 
designed to encourage voter engagement and screen its 
telephone list for non-working numbers. Live calls were 
made to the resulting list of working numbers, encouraging 
voter participation. A total of 8,831 targeted individuals 
were contacted by phone, representing 27 percent of the 
target population. This rate ranged from 41 percent in 
Fresno County to 20 percent in San Bernardino. The 
overall contact rate is more than double the corresponding rate in June of 2006, which suggests 
that a preliminary round of robotic calls is an effective and inexpensive means by which to 
improve the effi ciency of a live phone bank.
Prior to the November election, NALEO’s callers reminded voters of the upcoming election 
and stressed the impact of elections on voters and their families, including issues of jobs, education, 
health care and immigration. Voters were asked to verbally pledge to vote and, regardless of the 
response, were encouraged to call the group’s toll-free number with any questions about voting 
or the election.
 
Fresno County
(N=15,962)
Los Angeles County
(N=16,968)
Orange County
(N=12,830)
Riverside County
(N=11,468)
San Bernardino County
(N=11,714)
All 5 Counties Pooled
(N=68,942)
Contact rate
9.2%
12.4%
9.6%
10.6%
9.9%
 
% Voting, control group
6.4%
19.5%
18.5%
14.4%
8.3%
% Voting, 
treatment group
6.1%
19.8%
19.3%
15.0%
8.7%
 
2SLS 
treatment-on-treated 
effect, with covariates
-2.7
(4.2)
2.1
(5.0)
8.4
(7.2)
5.8
(6.3)
3.6
(5.1)
2.1
(2.4)
 A preliminary round of robotic 
calls is an effective and inexpensive 
means by which to improve the 
effi ciency of a live phone bank.
Table 12. Contact Rates, Intent-to-Treat Effects and Treatment-on-Treated Effects for NALEO Campaign, June 2006
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To gauge the effectiveness of this voter mobilization campaign, households (defi ned by a 
common telephone number) were randomly assigned to treatment or control groups. This random 
assignment was conducted separately for each county in order to accommodate the expected capacity 
of each county’s phone bank. Callers at each site recorded whether they succeeded in speaking with 
targeted voters.
Three kinds of statistical analysis were conducted, all of which take account of the fact 
that households, not individuals, were the unit of random assignment. First, the effects of the initial 
round of robotic calls were gauged. Consistent with past experiments on the effects of robotic 
calls conducted by this and other groups, no effect was found (b = -0.2 percent, SE = 0.6 percent, 
N = 61,422). Second, was an assessment of the average effects of live phone calls among those who 
were actually reached by phone. In keeping with other analyses, this estimation was conducted by 
means of an instrumental variables regression in which vote is regressed on contact with canvassers. 
Random assignment is used as an instrumental variable. This analysis was conducted separately for 
each of the counties because NALEO’s contact rates varied markedly across precincts. As shown in 
Table 13, pooling the results across fi ve county-level experiments generates an average treatment 
effect of 0.7 percentage points (SE = 1.5). 
Finally, the campaign was examined to fi nd whether its success varied according to 
three categories that the group used to classify its targeted voters: young voters (age 18 to 24), 
new registrants, and low-propensity voters (who have voted in no more than half of the last 
four elections). NALEO seems to have been especially effective in mobilizing young voters. 
Among young voters (N = 12,542), the effect was fairly strong: Contact increased turnout by 
Fresno County
(N=7,991)
Los Angeles County
(N=11,260)
Orange County
(N=8,392)
Riverside County
(N=7,552)
San Bernardino County
(N=9,212)
All 5 Counties Pooled
(N=44,407)
Young Voters (18-24)
(N=12,542)
Non-Young Voters (25+) 
(N=31,865)
Contact rate
41.4%
25.9%
29.4%
21.0%
19.9%
 
% Voting, control group
20.8%
49.4%
39.0%
34.5%
17.7%
% Voting, 
treatment group
23.1%
47.0%
39.3%
37.4%
17.5%
 
2SLS 
treatment-on-treated 
effect, with covariates
1.2
(2.2)
-4.4
(5.3)
-0.4
(3.3)
11.8
(5.4)
-2.5
(4.0)
0.7
(1.5)
4.4+
(3.0)
0.0
(1.9)
+ p<.10, one-tailed. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Table 13. Contact Rates, Intent-to-Treat Effects and Treatment-on-Treated Effects for NALEO Campaign, November 2006
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4.4 percentage points with a standard error of 3.0 percentage points. This effect has a p-value 
of .06, which means that there would be a 6 percent chance of seeing an estimated effect this large 
if the true effect were zero. By contrast, the effect among non-young voters (N = 31,865) was 
0.0 percentage points with a standard error of 1.9. The difference in coeffi cients for young and 
non-young is marginally signifi cant (p < .10). Thus, the overall average effect of 0.7 percentage 
points refl ects the relative sizes of these groups. 
One hypothesis coming out of the November 2006 analysis was that perhaps the scripts 
being used by NALEO were compromising the effectiveness of the mobilizing conversation. 
NALEO’s March 2007 phone banking campaign was designed to test this hypothesis: the 
organization conducted a live phone banking campaign for the Los Angeles municipal election 
with two different scripts. One script, mirroring that used in previous campaigns, was relatively 
short, reminding voters of the upcoming election and encouraging participation. The second script 
was more information-rich, aiming to also educate voters about the candidates and issues on the 
ballot. Registered voters in single- and multi-voter households were randomized separately, and 
the treatment groups were then further subdivided into two random groups, one for each type 
of script. Overall, 5,822 voters were slated for treatment in this campaign.
This third California Votes Initiative experiment by NALEO was markedly more 
successful than those previous. Contact rates were signifi cantly higher: 45.3 percent for the 
informational message group and 41.0 percent for the basic message group. Unfortunately, these 
greatly different contact rates (having a difference of 4.3 percentage points) preclude a direct 
comparison of the effectiveness of the two messages. The data, however, are suggestive, even 
if not conclusive, that the longer, more informative scripts worked better in mobilizing targeted 
voters: In single-voter households, turnout in the control group was 14.4 percent, compared to 
16.6 percent for those targeted to receive the informational message and 16.8 percent for those 
targeted to receive the basic message. In multi-voter households, turnout in the control group 
was 19.3 percent, compared to 22.5 percent for those targeted to receive the informational 
message and 20.7 percent for those targeted to receive the basic message (Table 14). 
Single-voter households
(N=2,786)
Multi-voter households
(N=3,660)
All households
(N=6,446)
% Voting
16.6%
22.5%
19.9%
 
Contact rate 
40.8%
48.5%
45.3%
 
% Voting
16.8%
20.7%
18.9%
 
Contact rate
39.4%
42.3%
41.0%
 
% Voting
14.4%
19.3%
17.3%
 
Informational message group Basic message group Control group
Table 14. Contact Rates and Intent-to-Treat Effects for NALEO Campaign, March 2007
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Orange County Asian Pacifi c Islander Community Alliance
The Orange County Asian Pacifi c Islander Community Alliance (OCAPICA) has worked 
for more than a decade to improve opportunities and outcomes for low-income Asian and 
Pacifi c Islander Americans in Orange County, including programs covering youth development, 
education, community health and economic development. While OCAPICA has long been 
active in political issues of concern to the Asian Pacifi c Islander community, the organization 
directly mobilized voters for the fi rst time in fall 2006. In addition to OCAPICA’s phone 
banking campaign, the organization collaborated with the Orange County Registrar to engage 
the community in workshops and presentations that focused on how to register, obtain and use 
absentee ballots, and request in-language voting materials. OCAPICA worked with the registrar 
to discuss recruitment of bilingual poll workers, planning and organizing town hall meetings, 
training of poll workers, display of in-language materials at polling places, name badges for 
bilingual poll workers and polling place signage. 
OCAPICA also conducted a variety of community outreach activities. In the Chinese 
community, the organization distributed more than 3,000 Easy Voter Guides at outreach events 
at Chinese churches, community organizations and markets. OCAPICA sent a community 
bulletin with voting information to 500 residents and worked to place fi ve articles in Chinese 
newspapers about voting. In the Korean community, the organization distributed more than 
3,000 Easy Voter Guides at outreach events in Korean churches, community organizations and 
markets, and another 2,000 at a local Korean festival. In the Vietnamese community, OCAPICA 
distributed more than 2,000 Easy Voter Guides and other voting information on site at three local 
businesses, worked to place 13 articles about voting in Vietnamese newspapers, and participated 
in three talk shows on Vietnamese radio. The organization collaborated with the local Vietnamese 
radio station weather and traffi c announcer to mention voting in every morning broadcast, and 
it also arranged for a voting song, titled “Power of the Ballot,” to be played on three different 
Vietnamese radio programs every day from September 17 through Election Day. 
“Power of the Ballot” Translated Text
Let us vote in multitude
To echo the voice of community
Only when we vote
Then needs and concerns will be addressed
We would no longer be ignored
Power of the ballot is immeasurable
One day, our dream will take shape
So don’t take democracy lightly
We feel pity for our homeland
Still living in tyranny, destitution
Many have fallen to have privileges to vote
Here we have the rights to contribute
To speak and to voice our will
Let us remind each other
Let all corners turn out to vote
Aunties, uncles and friends
Let us pledge with the ballot in hand.
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In the weeks prior to the November 2006 election, OCAPICA conducted a phone-based voter 
mobilization campaign designed to encourage participation by members of the Asian Pacifi c Islander 
American community living in Orange County. Canvassers included 11 Vietnamese Americans, 
four Chinese Americans (Mandarin speakers), and fi ve Korean Americans, all of whom were 
fully bilingual. One of the Korean volunteers was a prominent community leader whose voice 
was often recognized by contacted voters. All of the Vietnamese volunteers were over age 40. 
Younger volunteers within other Asian Pacifi c Islander communities were generally assigned to 
call voters under age 35.
Target communities were registered voters of Chinese, Korean, or Vietnamese ancestry. The 
outreach campaign consisted of Easy Voter Guides and/or phone calls from the group’s local phone 
bank. For each ancestry group, households were divided between those likely to be predominantly 
English-speaking and those that were not, using the same criteria as that used by APALC. This 
distinction created six ancestry-by-language combinations. Chinese American registered voters were 
sent either English or Chinese translation Easy Voter Guides and were called in either English or 
Mandarin. Korean American registered voters were sent either English or Korean translation Easy 
Voter Guides and called in English or Korean. Vietnamese American registered voters were sent 
either English or Vietnamese translation Easy Voter Guides and called in English or Vietnamese. 
OCAPICA’s callers encouraged individuals to take an interest in the issues surrounding 
the November election, provided polling locations and times, and attempted to reply to common 
reasons for not voting. Contact rates for the phone-calling campaign varied by national origin 
and by language within national origin group. Rates included: 40 percent among Mandarin-speaking 
Chinese American targets, 20 percent among English-speaking Chinese American targets, 55 percent 
among Korean-speaking Korean American targets, 38 percent among English-speaking Korean 
American targets, 41 percent among Vietnamese-speaking Vietnamese American targets, and 30 
percent among English-speaking Vietnamese American targets. The phone banks attempted to 
contact all voters at least three times but evidently had a harder time reaching English-speakers 
across all the national origin groups.
Estimation of the effects of phone calls and mailing of Easy Voter Guides took into account 
the fact that households, not individuals, were the unit of random assignment. The average effects of 
mobilization were gauged among people actually reached 
by phone. This analysis was conducted by means of an 
instrumental variables regression. This regression controls 
for whether the voter received a mailing. Table 15 depicts 
the intent-to-treat effects. Overall, the effects for the phone 
bank tended to be positive, while those for the Easy Voter 
Guide were mixed. As Table 16 shows, the results were highly variable across ethnic and linguistic 
subgroups, due to the sizable standard errors associated with each subgroup’s estimates. Pooling across 
all groups generated a treatment-on-treated phone contact effect of 2.9 percentage points (SE = 2.5). 
 Overall, the effects for the phone bank 
tended to be positive, while those for 
the Easy Voter Guide were mixed.
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Adding controls for voting in the previous four elections increased the estimate to 4.2 percentage 
points and decreased the standard error to 2.3 percentage points. The effects of mailings were 
weakly negative and statistically insignifi cant.
Overall, distribution of the Easy Voter Guides produced disappointing results, while phone 
calls generated treatment-on-treated results close to or exceeding the 3 percentage-point level that 
is typical of this type of intervention. 
 Ethnicity
Chinese
Chinese
Korean
Korean
Vietnamese
Vietnamese
All groups pooled 
All groups pooled 
All groups pooled 
Language 
of contact
Mandarin
English
Korean
English
Vietnamese
English
 
Non-English
English
N 
3,683
2,517
3,290
1,625
9,971
6,022
27,108
16,944
10,164
2SLS phone 
no covariates
-5.2
(6.4)
26.4
(17.3)
-3.1
(4.6)
0.3
(7.4)
5.1
(4.5)
18.0*
(6.7)
2.9
(2.5)
-0.1
(2.9)
11.1*
(4.7)
2SLS mail 
no covariates
2.3
(1.7)
-5.2*
(2.6)
3.1
(2.3)
-3.1
(2.7)
0.2
(1.4)
-3.8*
(1.9)
-0.6
(0.9)
1.8
(1.1)
-4.0*
(1.3)
2SLS phone 
with covariates
0.2
(6.0)
22.9
(16.4)
1.3
(4.2)
2.8
(7.0)
3.8
(4.2)
13.7*
(6.1)
  4.2*
(2.3)
2.1
(2.7)
  9.9*
(4.4)
2SLS mail 
with covariates
1.1
(1.6)
 -4.1+
(2.5)
0.7
(2.1)
-3.1
(2.6)
0.3
(1.3)
-3.1+
(1.7)
-0.8
(0.7)
0.6
(0.9)
-3.3*
(1.2)
Table 16. Treatment-on-Treated Effects for OCAPICA Campaign, November 2006 Election
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates obtained by regressing vote on phone contact and mail, using assignment to phone calls and mail as 
instrumental variables. Covariates include voter history for fi ve previous statewide elections. + = p<.10, * = p<.05.
Ethnicity 
Chinese
Chinese
Korean
Korean
Vietnamese
Vietnamese
Language
Mandarin
English
Korean
English
Vietnamese
English
Phone call 
contact rate 
40.1%
19.8%
54.9%
38.0%
40.8%
30.4%
Control group 
turnout rate 
32.7%
(1,809)
26.5%
(1,879)
32.3%
(1,501)
17.7%
(864)
36.1%
(2,560)
24.5%
(4,927)
Phone call 
treatment group 
turnout rate 
n/a
n/a
n/a
15.2%
(33)
n/a
29.8%
(312)
Mailer treatment 
group turnout rate 
35.0%
(1,385)
21.3%
(314)
35.4%
(644)
14.1%
(206)
36.4%
(1,443)
20.9%
(345)
Phone call and 
mailer treatment 
group turnout rate
32.9%
(489)
26.5%
(324)
33.7%
(1,145)
14.8%
(522)
38.5%
(1,445)
26.3%
(438)
Table 15. Turnout Rates and Contact Rates for OCAPICA Campaign, November 2006 Election
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Pacifi c Institute for Community Organization
The Pacifi c Institute for Community Organization (PICO) is a statewide network of 
19 faith-based community organizations. The network has been active since 1995, training local 
community and congregation members in ways to improve the quality of life in low-income and 
immigrant communities through policy initiatives. Prior to PICO’s involvement in this project, 
the network had conducted numerous grassroots voter registration and get-out-the-vote 
campaigns, typically targeted at local ballot initiatives concerning education and affordable 
housing, such as the affordable housing bond measure on the November 2002 ballot 
(Proposition 46). In the weeks leading up to the June 2006 elections, PICO launched a diverse 
round of get-out-the-vote experiments aimed at mobilizing members of PICO-affi liated churches 
and their surrounding communities, which often include ethnic minorities living in low-income 
neighborhoods, as illustrated in Table 17. With the exception of live calls made by two groups 
in Stockton, PICO’s interventions in June 2006 tended to be those commonly characterized 
as “indirect” as they do not involve a person-to-person conversation. Such tactics included 
postcards, leafl ets and robotic calls. 
These indirect treatments, however, sometimes included personal touches. For example, 
one congregation distributed a small number of handwritten letters. Its robotic calls were recorded 
by a local pastor — a credible and distinguished source. Leafl ets and certain postcards provided 
useful information about polling place location and local candidates. A meta-analysis of the 
postcard experiments shows that neither the standard postcard nor the postcard with polling 
place information increased voter turnout.
Leafl eting produced one interesting and unexpected result. On the Saturday before 
Election Day, Long Beach canvassers distributed voter guides that summarized local candidates’ 
positions on four leading issues, as expressed in a PICO-sponsored candidate forum. The result 
was immense: a 9.2 percentage-point increase in 
turnout, which is statistically signifi cant at the 
.01 level. The unexpected success of this type 
of leafl eting prompted follow-up experiments in 
November 2006. The PICO affi liate in Long Beach 
distributed door hangers that encouraged voting 
to help solve local problems. Another affi liate in 
Fullerton distributed a one-page fl yer in English 
and Spanish to targeted voters that presented the issue positions and other information about 
Fullerton City Council candidates. Unlike in June 2006, neither of the November leafl eting 
experiments raised turnout.
Other PICO efforts in June, though potentially promising for the future, produced results 
that were either disappointing or ambiguous. Of eight small affi liate experiments using robotic 
calls recorded by local pastors, only one seemed to lead to higher turnout. A meta-analysis of 
 When canvassers distributed voter guides 
that summarized local candidates’ positions 
on four leading issues, the result was 
immense — but could not be achieved 
again in subsequent attempts.
I N S I G H T  N E W  E X P E R I M E N T S  I N  M I N O R I T Y  V O T E R  M O B I L I Z A T I O N
P A G E  3 0  |  T H E  J A M E S  I R V I N E  F O U N D A T I O N
these results suggests that these calls do not increase voter participation. This fi nding is consistent 
with a long list of experimental studies on the mobilizing effects of robotic phone calls.24 The 
handwritten notes also produced disappointing results; however, the small size of the treatment 
group in this study (N = 223) means that this fi nding is subject to a great deal of statistical 
uncertainty and that this tactic requires further study. Live phone calls, a mobilization tactic that 
typically produces positive effects, yielded mixed results in this case. One local organizing ministry 
did two rounds of calls during the week prior to the election, and a second congregation’s callers 
conducted three rounds of calls, one of which occurred on Election Day. One of the two sites 
produced a positive effect, but in each case the small sample size means that the results are 
subject to a great deal of statistical uncertainty.
 
Fresno
LA – site 2
Stockton – site 1
Stockton – site 2
LA – site 4
Orange County
Long Beach – site 1
Long Beach – site 2
Long Beach – site 3
Long Beach – site 4
Long Beach – site 2
Long Beach – site 3
Long Beach – site 4
LA – site 1
LA – site 2
LA – site 3
LA – site 4
Sacramento – site 1
Sacramento – site 2
Type of intervention
Robotic call from pastor
Robotic call from pastor
Live phone calls 
Live phone calls 
Handwritten letter
Leaﬂet with polling 
place location
Leaﬂet with local 
voting guide
Postcard with polling 
place location
Postcard with polling 
place location
Postcard with polling 
place location
Postcard
Postcard
Postcard
Postcard
Postcard
Postcard
Postcard
Postcard
Postcard
 
N
(control + treatment)
383
984
254
1,040
587
3,610
647
251
1,082
892
287
1,097
851
1,549
984
2,404
852
1,291
3,018
Intent-to-treat 
effect (% pts.)
3.09
-4.92
3.00
-0.66
-1.72
1.13
9.16
1.78
4.22
-1.05
2.85
0.76
0.86
-2.62
0.44
-0.42
2.99
6.25
0.71
 
Robust cluster 
standard error
5.53
3.61
6.81
3.64
4.78
1.42
3.53
5.17
2.35
2.75
5.38
2.03
2.89
3.11
3.67
2.44
4.01
3.23
2.32
 
Table 17. Turnout Rates for PICO Campaigns, June 2006 Election
24 Green and Gerber (2004).
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During the weeks leading up to the November election, PICO’s affi liates launched an 
array of experiments that tested the effects of randomly-assigned combinations of robotic calls 
from pastors, live phone calls from local phone banks, leafl ets, mailers and door-to-door canvassing. 
The innovation in the November campaign was door-to-door canvassing, a tactic that PICO’s 
affi liates had not used during the June 2006 campaign. All of the door-to-door canvassing 
experiments distributed Easy Voter Guides. Another innovation was the use of multiple contacts. 
Many of these campaigns were small in size but well-executed, judging from the high contact 
rates they achieved. The four door-to-door efforts in Sacramento, Colusa, Fullerton and Bakersfi eld 
reached 32.7 percent, 66.8 percent, 47.6 percent and 22.4 percent of their targeted individuals, 
respectively. Contact rates for phone campaigns ranged from a high of 87.4 percent in Colusa 
to a low of 17 percent for one site in Los Angeles. Overall, PICO affi liates directly contacted 3,369 
voters at their homes or by telephone and many thousands more through indirect methods of 
robotic calls, leafl ets and mailers.
In order to gauge the effectiveness of this voter mobilization campaign, households were 
randomly assigned to treatment or control groups for each affi liate. Treatment groups were 
then further randomly subdivided as needed to create target groups for different methods or 
combinations of methods of outreach being planned by each affi liate. For door-to-door efforts and 
live phone banking, canvassers recorded whether they succeeded in speaking with targeted voters. 
The pattern of voter turnout for each experimental group is illustrated in Table 18. The 
table’s notes briefl y describe each outreach campaign. Table 19 reports in greater statistical detail 
the apparent effects of the canvassing and phone calling efforts at each site. 
Pooling across sites, door-to-door canvassing proved to be the most effective tactic, increasing 
turnout by 4.0 percentage points among those whom the canvassers contacted. The standard error 
of 2.8 percentage points implies that there is an 8 percent probability that one would observe an 
effect as large as 4 percentage points simply by chance. The other tactics were apparently ineffective. 
The average treatment-on-treated effect of phone calls was -0.8 percentage points. The standard 
error of 2.3 percentage points leaves open the possibility that these calls were, in fact, as effective as 
typical nonpartisan calls (which have an effect of about 3 percentage points). Robotic calls from local 
pastors had an average intent-to-treat effect of 0.4 percentage points; the fact that the standard error 
of this result is just 0.8 percentage points means that it is highly unlikely that such calls have an 
effect of greater than 2 percentage points. This result reinforces the emerging conclusion that robotic 
calls are ineffective, even when recorded by a trusted source. In contrast to June 2006, neither of the 
November leafl eting experiments raised turnout. The most disappointing result of all concerns the 
effects of postcards. The cards were shown to have a -1.8 percentage-point effect on turnout. Given 
the standard error of 0.7 percentage points, this result is statistically signifi cant in the unexpected 
direction. It appears that the one tactic that worked well was door-to-door canvassing, which 
increased turnout by 4 percentage points. On average, none of the other four tactics — phone calls, 
robotic calls, direct mail, or leafl ets — appeared to mobilize PICO’s target constituency, regardless 
of whether they were used separately or in combination. 
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Stockton
Sacramento
Colusa
(live call)
Colusa
(door)
Arbuckle
Williams
San Bernardino
Fresno
Orange County
LA – site 1
LA – site 2
LA – site 3
LA – site 4
LA – site 5
LA – site 6
LA – site 7
Visalia
Long Beach – 
site 1
Long Beach – 
site 2
Bakersﬁeld
Control
36.3%
(190)
35.3%
(218)
62.2%
(450)
66.5%
(982)
40.4%
(245)
50.2%
(217)
34.1%
(273)
36.5%
(211)
37.3%
(542)
46.3%
(575)
47.1%
(550)
36.0%
(375)
54.0%
(565)
45.0%
(686)
51.8%
(357)
49.9%
(515)
38.6%
(477)
31.7%
(463)
45.6%
(450)
44.1%
(719)
Door
39.7%
(234)
72.9%
(258)
34.2%
(863)
42.8%
(474)
Live call
39.9%
(386)
64.6% 
(1,363)
46.9%
(520)
50.6%
(500)
44.0%
(672)
48.1%
(615)
42.2%
(500)
49.0%
(789)
38.5%
(919)
48.6%
(650)
Robotic
call
33.2%
(253)
47.0%
(658)
45.3%
(618)
40.6%
(508)
50.8%
(793)
46.3%
(915)
45.9%
(654)
52.8%
(956)
Mailer
30.7%
(251)
45.1%
(658)
46.4%
(621)
38.9%
(496)
47.9%
(685)
38.9%
(913)
46.2%
(964)
31.0%
(1,185)
Leaﬂet
26.1%
(245)
31.8%
(1,096)
45.1%
(933)
Live and
robotic
call
49.4%
(695)
Mail and
leaﬂet
33.8%
(225)
Robotic
call and
leaﬂet
35.6%
(239)
Robotic
call and
mail
45.4%
(670)
48.2%
(625)
49.7%
(969)
Live and
mail
47.1%
(660)
45.9%
(617)
Door, 
live and 
mail
32.2%
(547)
Stockton: Phone banking conducted by a local church-based group. 
Sacramento: Door-to-door canvassing conducted by a local church-based group. Eight volunteers and four staff knocked on doors of voters who participated 
in four or fewer of the past six elections, passing out Easy Voter Guides and reminding people to vote. Guides and notes were left for people not at 
home. Almost all of the volunteers who participated in the door-to-door outreach were bilingual in Spanish or Hmong, although most of the people in the 
neighborhood they targeted (which was near one of their member churches that has a Spanish-speaking congregation) spoke English. Four of the eight 
volunteers were 18 years old or under.
Colusa/Arbuckle/Williams: Door-to-door canvassing and phone banking conducted by a local church-based group. Door-to-door in Colusa city only. These 
are three small towns north of Sacramento, all in Colusa County. Many of the volunteers were recent graduates of the group’s citizenship classes, primarily 
Spanish speakers reaching out to Spanish speakers. Easy Voter Guides were distributed in English and Spanish. Door-to-door canvassing was conducted by 
three volunteers. Phone banking was conducted by seven volunteers in Colusa, six volunteers in Arbuckle, and six volunteers in Williams. The volunteers 
overcame fears of public speaking and language barriers in order to encourage others to vote.
San Bernardino: Combination door-to-door, live phone banking and mailers by a local church-based group. Door-to-door canvassers distributed Easy Voter 
Guides. Mailers included a brief recap of a voter forum held in conjunction with the League of Women Voters as well as a reminder to vote.
Fresno: Mailers, leafl ets and robotic calls. Postcard content emphasized “sacred duty” to vote and that responsible citizenship is a virtue in the Catholic 
tradition. The robotic call, made by the local pastor, described voting as a responsibility and the way to help build a just society.
Table 18: Turnout Percentages for PICO Campaigns, November 2006 Election (N in parentheses)
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Orange County/Fullerton: Door-to-door canvassing conducted by a local church-based group. Distributed Easy Voter Guides as well as a homemade 
nonpartisan guide for city council candidates. Materials were left at households where people were not at home. Some canvassers experienced 
language barriers in trying to communicate with voters.
Los Angeles: Phone banking, robotic calls, and postcards from various Catholic churches in a local church-based group. Robotic calls were recorded by 
pastors; most were bilingual. Phone banking conducted mainly by youth due to need for bilingual volunteers. Postcard emphasized Catholic duty to be 
a responsible citizen; phone calls characterized voting as a duty of citizens. 
Visalia: Postcard sent by a local church-based group. Graphic read “Faithful Citizenship” and body content mentioned concern for health and safety of 
neighborhood as reason to vote. The postcard also included polling place information. 
Long Beach: Leafl eting conducted by a local church-based group. Door hangers reminded voters to participate and mentioned issues of youth violence, 
affordable housing, air quality and health care. Site two’s leafl ets featured images of Jesus and Mary.
Bakersfi eld: Door-to-door canvassing conducted by a local church-based group. Canvassers delivered Easy Voter Guides and also conducted short 
interviews to determine priority issues among residents. Voters not at home were left a hand-written note followed up by a handwritten note.
 
Stockton
Sacramento
Colusa
Arbuckle
Williams
San Bernardino
Orange County
LA – site 1
LA – site 2
LA – site 3
LA – site 4
LA – site 5
LA – site 6
Bakersﬁeld
Door-to-door canvassing
13.4 (15.4)
19.8 (13.6)
9.6 (5.3)
7.6 (4.0)
-6.5 (6.6)
-5.4 (5.0)
-5.6 (15.4)
17.2 (10.6)
 
Live phone calls
9.7 (12.9)
8.6 (9.9)
0.6 (3.6)
-0.8 (3.0)
13.9 (9.9)
15.2 (9.3)
1.0 (12.7)
-1.0 (11.8)
-2.5 (12.1)
2.2 (10.7)
-0.9 (10.7)
-3.8 (9.4)
29.5 (17.9)
19.4 (16.1)
-29.0 (17.8)
-27.6 (16.5)
-28.3 (12.7)
-24.3 (10.9)
-11.5 (13.0)
-7.8 (11.9)
Door-to-door, 
live call and mailer
-7.2 (16.5)
-2.2 (10.8)
 
Table 19. Treatment-on-Treated Effects for PICO Door-to-Door Canvassing and Live Phone Banking 
Campaigns, November 2006 Election 
Entries in parentheses are robust cluster standard errors. The top entry in each cell reports the results without controls for past voter turnout; the lower 
entry reports the results after controlling for turnout in the previous four elections. All door-to-door canvassing used Easy Voter Guides. The experiment 
in Orange County also used a localized voter guide to the Fullerton City Council election. Some targets for LA sites one and two also received mailers. 
Some targets for LA site fi ve also received robotic calls.
I N S I G H T  N E W  E X P E R I M E N T S  I N  M I N O R I T Y  V O T E R  M O B I L I Z A T I O N
P A G E  3 4  |  T H E  J A M E S  I R V I N E  F O U N D A T I O N
Southwest Voter Registration Education Project
Perhaps the most striking experimental fi ndings to emerge from the 2006 California 
Votes Initiative studies come from the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP), 
a group that has long mobilized Latino voters in Los Angeles County. Voters in SVREP’s pool 
included Latino-surname voters who had registered after August 1, 2004, or had not voted in 
any primary or general election since 1998. The study was limited geographically to fi ve 
districts in Los Angeles that are heavily Latino (with average Latino populations of 48 percent). 
Approximately half of the target voters were age 25 or younger. 
The get-out-the-vote campaign consisted of three components: a preliminary mailing, 
calls from a local phone bank and door-to-door canvassing. Phone banking was the campaign’s 
centerpiece. The mailing, sent approximately 
three weeks before Election Day, included an 
inspirational message from the head of SVREP 
about the salience of the issues on the ballot for 
Latino voters. Phone canvassing was conducted 
in the three weeks prior to the election, with 
up to six attempts made to contact each 
individual on the treatment list. The average 
contact rate in treatment precincts was 24 percent. Callers asked residents whether they intended 
to vote; those who responded affi rmatively were contacted a second time the day before the 
election and reminded to vote.25 As time allowed, some voters were contacted an additional time 
between the initial and reminder calls. 
Door-to-door canvassing was conducted on November 4 and 5 — the weekend prior 
to Election Day. Only large precincts (roughly 16 or more) where the phone banking campaign 
indicated a large number of likely voters were targeted for this aspect of the mobilization; 
precincts chosen for door-to-door canvassing were also selected based on geographical proximity 
to SVREP’s headquarters. Canvassers discussed with contacted voters the importance of voting, 
and they provided information about how to contact the local election offi ce if they had questions. 
They also left a copy of the inspirational message from the leader of SVREP that was included 
in the mailer. Overall, about 10 percent of precincts in the treatment group were targeted for 
door-to-door mobilization; the contact rate was approximately 15 percent.
The experimental design consisted of two rounds of random assignment. First, 478 
precincts were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The 432 treatment precincts 
comprised 29,316 individuals, while the 46 control precincts comprised 3,071 individuals. The 
treatment precincts were further divided into treatment households comprising 25,000 voters and 
control households comprising the remaining 4,316. Excluding approximately 4 percent of the 
25 This tactic, incidentally, proved highly effective in an experiment involving a PIRG mobilization campaign directed at young voters in 2003 
(Green 2004).
 Callers asked contacted voters whether 
they intended to vote; those who responded 
affi rmatively were contacted a second 
time the day before the election and 
reminded to vote.
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sample who moved or dropped off the voter registration lists by the time of voting in 2006, 
the remaining control group comprised 7,387 people, and the treatment group comprised 24,154 
people. Within the treatment group, 23.7 percent were contacted at some point by phone and just 
2.8 percent by face-to-face canvassers. Because door-to-door canvassing was such a small part of 
SVREP’s outreach campaign, including this form of contact in the analysis would have been nearly 
inconsequential. For simplicity and to isolate the effects of phone calls, attention was focused on the 
precincts where no canvassing occurred. In the geographic subset (N = 8,390), the treatment group 
was contacted by phone at a rate of 24 percent and voted at a rate of 36.5 percent, as compared to 
a voting rate of 34.3 percent in the control group. As shown in Table 20, the treatment-on-treated 
effect of phone calls is 9.1 percentage points with a robust cluster standard error of 3.2 percentage 
points. Whether viewed in comparison to the results presented above or in comparison to other 
recent experimental studies of phone banking, this estimate stands out as possibly the strongest 
documented effect for live phone calls in a study that included a large number of observations.26 
Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education
Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education (SCOPE) has worked since 1993 
to reduce structural barriers to social and economic opportunities for poor and working class 
communities. For many years, the organization has also 
strived to increase civic engagement and voter turnout in 
disadvantaged communities. SCOPE’s voter mobilization 
campaign for the June 2006 election focused on low 
propensity voters living in 26 selected precincts in South 
Los Angeles, where the organization has focused its 
mobilization efforts over several election cycles. The door-to-door campaign was conducted by two 
kinds of canvassers, volunteers working on Saturdays and paid street teams working throughout the 
week. The campaign started in mid May, about four weeks before Election Day, but made the bulk 
of its contacts during the last four days of the campaign. During the weekend before Election Day, 
SCOPE also attempted to speak again with voters it had contacted earlier.
   
 
Contact
  
N
 
2SLS model, 
no covariates
    9.3**
(3.1)
25,862
 
2SLS model, 
with covariates
    9.1**
(3.2)
25,862
 
Table 20. Turnout Effects of SVREP Phonebank Campaign, November 2006 (Clustered Standard Errors)
** p<.01, one-tailed. Includes only the subset of precincts where no door-to-door canvassing occurred. Standard errors in parentheses.
26 This fi gure is infl ated somewhat by the effects of mailings, but judging from other mailing experiments, this bias is likely to be relatively small. 
 Canvassers who walk precincts 
in which they live are substantially 
more effective than other canvassers.
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In all, this face-to-face canvassing effort reached 1,943 targeted voters, for an overall 
contact rate of 34.6 percent. Individuals assigned to the treatment group were contacted at 
rates ranging from 7.3 percent to 53.9 percent across precincts. 2SLS was used to estimate the 
treatment-on-treated effect in each precinct, since precincts’ rates of contact and turnout varied 
markedly. Across precincts, turnout in the control group samples ranged from 6.3 percent to 
30.5 percent. Pooling over precincts, door-to-door contact increased turnout by an estimated 
8.0 percentage points with a standard error of 3.0 percentage points, statistically signifi cant at 
the p < .01 level (Table 21). 
One interesting, albeit tentative, fi nding from the June SCOPE experiment was that 
canvassers who walked precincts in which they live were substantially more effective than other 
canvassers. This fi nding fell short of statistical signifi cance but warranted further investigation, 
as described in the account of the November canvassing effort. 
SCOPE’s November campaign also used door-to-door canvassing techniques. The target 
population was South Los Angeles registered voters who had voted in fewer than three of the 
previous fi ve elections. In this campaign, “re-contacts” were conducted as a separate experiment. 
The door-to-door campaign began on October 7 and ran every day each week but Sunday 
through Election Day. Leaders and canvassers had two training opportunities in September before 
the program was launched. And each day before the start of canvassing, participants took part 
in role playing and evaluation. 
In all, this face-to-face canvassing effort reached 5,341 targeted voters, for an overall 
contact rate of 45.3 percent (Table 22). 2SLS was used to estimate the treatment-on-treated effect 
in each precinct, since precincts’ rates of contact and turnout varied markedly. Pooling over 
precincts, door-to-door contact increased turnout by an estimated 6.6 percentage points with 
a standard error of 2.1 percentage points, statistically signifi cant at the p < .05 level.
Pooling across precincts, home-turf canvassers increased turnout by 7.0 percentage points, 
with a standard error of 2.8, while non-home-turf canvassers had a smaller effect (3.7 percentage 
points, SE = 2.7) that is not statistically distinguishable from zero (Table 23). The difference 
in effectiveness between home-turf canvassers and other canvassers falls just short of statistical 
signifi cance, warranting further investigation. 
Treatment Group
(N=5,430)
Control Group
(N=1,782)
% Contacted
34.6%
 
% Voting
18.3%
17.3%
 
Treatment-on-treated effect
    8.0**
(3.0)
 
Table 21. Contact Rates, Intent-to-Treat Effects and Treatment-on-Treated Effects for SCOPE Campaign, June 2006
** p<.01, one-tailed. Standard error in parentheses. Due to varying contact rates in different precincts, this estimate was obtained by pooling estimated 
effects precinct by precinct.
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Treatment Group
(N=11,789)
Control Group
(N=3,578)
% Contacted
45.3%
 
% Voting
36.7%
33.7%
Treatment-on-treated effect
    6.6**
(2.1)
 
Table 22. Contact Rates, Intent-to-Treat Effects and Treatment-on-Treated Effects for SCOPE Campaign, November 2006
** p<.01, one-tailed. Standard error in parentheses.
Contact
N
Home-turf 
canvassers
  8.5*
(3.0)
5,545
 
Not home-turf 
canvassers
    5.2**
(2.9)
9,822
Home-turf 
canvassers
  7.0*
(2.8)
5,545
 
Not home-turf 
canvassers
3.7
(2.7)
9,822
2SLS model, no covariates 2SLS model, with covariates
Table 23. Turnout Effects of SCOPE Campaign, November 2006 (Clustered Standard Errors)
** p<.01, * p<.05, one-tailed. Standard errors in parentheses.
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In keeping with prior experimental fi ndings, the evaluation of the Initiative outreach conducted 
before the June and November 2006 elections found that direct personal appeals tend to work 
best. The impact of the various outreach campaigns is illustrated in Table 24.
Best Practices 
1. Campaigns should ideally use face-to-face canvassing. 
The most personal and immediate of voter outreach methods, face-to-face canvassing is recommended 
whenever possible.
2. Phone bank calling is enhanced by pre-screening and follow-up with those who earlier expressed 
an intention to vote. 
The next most effective option is live phone banks. While Initiative results do not recommend the 
exclusive use of robotic calls, using these pre-recorded calls to screen out bad numbers maximizes 
the effi ciency of a subsequent live phone bank — this is of particular importance in large-scale outreach 
efforts. Also, follow-up calls should be made to those who express an intention to vote during the fi rst 
contact. In contrast to the fi ndings of previous research, the Initiative’s results suggest that investment 
in follow-up calls made to this select subset of likely voters is a wise use of resources that can result in 
signifi cant increases in turnout. 
3. Canvassers should be well-trained and drawn from the local communities of interest. 
The effectiveness of using local face-to-face and phone bank canvassers affi liated with local organizations 
is likely infl uenced by the rapport and trust they are able to establish with contacted voters. But this cannot 
be taken for granted; even local canvassers from a trusted organization need to be well trained in order 
for their contacts with voters to be effective. This is a fi nding supported not only by Initiative experiments, 
but by previous published work as well.
4. An information-rich message may be more effective than a basic one. 
Various experiments testing different messages have generally found that the content of the message does 
not matter. But a March 2007 NALEO experiment found that an information-rich phone bank message 
was more effective than a shorter message. However, this may be because the information-rich message 
was more interactive, resulting in a deeper conversation with contacted voters beyond the delivery of a 
memorized script. The effect then may signify evidence of the importance of a quality contact, rather than 
the importance of the content of the delivered message, confi rming what is known from previous research. 
Other Initiative experiments, and other published experiments, have failed to fi nd any message effects.
5. Going to the fi eld too early can decrease the effectiveness of a campaign. 
Timing matters to both door-to-door canvassing and phone bank canvassing. Initiative fi ndings recommend 
that canvassing not begin before four weeks out from Election Day. Although an organization’s earlier 
efforts may help build its reputation in the community, voters are unlikely to recall or be infl uenced by 
get-out-the-vote messages made several months before the polls open.
How best to mobilize voters in communities comprised largely of infrequent voters? The 
following best practices emerged from the California Votes Initiative experiments to date.
Conclusions
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Outcomes by Approach
Door-to-door Canvassing
Door-to-door efforts yielded a high effect of 33.6 percentage points (as well as other strong 
but common effects including 6.9 to 8 percentage points) in turnout among voters contacted within 
an organization’s home turf. Some door-to-door efforts either resulted in a very small impact of 
1 to 4 percentage points or failed to have a statistically signifi cant effect on voter participation. Closer 
examination of these experiments suggests that organizations that have an established relationship 
with the community achieve stronger results than do organizations without these relationships. 
Similarly, organizations that deploy canvassers in precincts close to their home neighborhoods 
usually achieve strong results as well. 
Pooled actual treatment effects*
June: 2.5% pts. (1.5)
Nov: 3.7% pts. (1.4)
Nov: youth (age 18-24) 13.4% pts. (5.0)
June: 33.6% pts. (11.7)
Nov: 6.9% pts. (4.1) (both counties)
3.3% pts. (4.7)
June: 0.9% pts. (2.7)
Nov: 3.4% pts. (2.9)
Nov: previous voters 15.7% pts. ( 5.6) 
June: 2.1% pts. (2.4) (all ﬁve counties)
Nov: 1.1% pts. (0.7)
Nov: youth (age 18-24) 4.4% pts. (3.0)
Nov: 4.2% pts. (2.3)
Nov: English calls 9.9% pts. (4.4)
Nov: 4.0% pts. (2.8)
9.1% pts. (3.2)
June: 8.0% pts. (3.0)
Nov: 6.6% pts. (2.1)
Contact rate
See Tables 2 (page 12) 
and 4 (page 15)
June: 24.5%
Nov: 9.3%
Nov: 17.5%
June: 30.7%
June: 43.9%
Nov: 52.8%
Fresno County – June: 9.2%, Nov: 41.4%
Orange County – June: 9.6%, Nov: 29.4%
LA County – June: 12.4%, Nov: 25.9%
Riverside County – June: 10.6%, Nov: 21.0%
San Bernardino County – June: 9.9%, Nov: 19.9%
Basic message: 41.0% 
Info-rich message: 45.3%
See Table 15 (page 28)
Sacramento – 32.7% (Nov) 
Colusa – 66.8% (Nov) 
Fullerton – 47.6% (Nov)
Bakersﬁeld – 22.4% (Nov)
24% (Nov)
June: 34.6%
Nov: 45.3%
Phone bank
Riverside City
San Bernardino County
Phone bank
Door-to-door
Phone bank
City of LA/March 2007
Phone bank
Door-to-door
Phone bank
Phone bank
APALC
CCAEJ
CARECEN
NALEO
OCAPICA
PICO
SVREP
SCOPE
Table 24. Pooled Treatment Effects, California Votes Initiative (percent voting)
*Actual treatment effects control statistically for the contact rate and voter history. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Past studies have shown that quality is also important. High-quality canvassers are 
enthusiastic, knowledgeable and conversational in their interactions with contacted voters. 
Less-qualifi ed canvassers may deliver messages in a way that sounds rehearsed, and they may 
be unable to have a true conversation with the voter about the election. Although this aspect 
of a successful campaign requires further research and was not specifi cally studied during this 
fi rst phase of the California Votes Initiative, organizations that spent more time training their 
volunteers were generally more successful than those who spent little time doing so. 
Another important factor is timing. One organization that had its canvassers walk precincts 
more than four weeks before the June election failed to have an impact on turnout. Although 
it is possible that the failure of this group to increase participation among its targeted voters was 
due to other issues with the campaign, this is unlikely given that this fi nding mirrors that of prior 
experiments with other populations. Generally, voters are not focused enough on the election this 
far out before Election Day for early contact to have an impact. When the same organization 
conducted a similar campaign during several weeks immediately prior to the November election, 
it had a signifi cant impact on voters who had participated in at least one prior election. 
Finally, we found that follow-up direct mail or postcards (including pledge cards signed 
by contacted voters) are not reliable ways to increase the effectiveness of a door-to-door effort. 
Several Initiative experiments split their treatment groups of voters into subgroups, some of which 
received these types of follow-up indirect contacts. In a few isolated instances, these subgroups 
had statistically signifi cant boosts in turnout. However, in the majority of cases, there was no 
measurable effect. 
Live Phone Banking
For the live phone banking effort using follow-ups with “yes” voters, the effect was 
9.1 percentage points in turnout. Several experiments realized stronger effects when targeting 
young voters or individuals who had voted in at least one prior election. 
Stronger phone bank results were achieved where the organization made follow-up calls to 
self-identifi ed likely voters. Some preliminary evidence suggests that an information-rich message 
may be more effective than a shorter, simpler message. Initiative experiments also indicated that 
large-scale phone banking efforts can be made more effi cient by using robotic calls to screen initial 
lists of telephone numbers, although robotic calls themselves do not increase turnout. 
Indirect Methods
By comparison, indirect methods proved to be of little value. Robotic calls, even when 
recorded by a person whom voters considered to be a trusted source, such as a local pastor, were 
not effective. Despite one experiment that showed some success with follow-up postcards that 
included personalized polling place information, this tactic was not found to be a consistently 
reliable method of increasing turnout. Similarly, direct mail and leafl ets or door hangers were 
generally not effective, even when using “homegrown” local voter guides or handwritten letters. 
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Further Study
Building upon fi ndings of the 2006 experiments, the California Votes Initiative evaluation team 
will join outreach organizations in designing experiments to discern further the effectiveness of various 
outreach strategies in encouraging greater voter participation in low-income and ethnic communities. 
Outstanding questions will be explored in the Initiative experiments planned for February, June and 
November 2008. 
Currently, it appears that mobilizing voters in low-propensity communities requires some 
form of live conversation, whether in person or on the phone. The features required to make this 
conversation successful merit further exploration. Although the evaluation team suspects that the 
quality and focus of the conversation determines the magnitude of its effects, and that the relationship 
of the canvassers to the community may matter, experimental researchers have only begun to 
conceptualize and measure the dimensions of quality. Rarely have aspects of quality been randomly 
manipulated within the context of a single outreach campaign.27 
The next steps in this line of research are, fi rst, to observe more closely the mobilization 
process in each group in order to develop testable propositions about best practices and, second, 
to craft a new line of experimental studies that establish which particular aspects of campaigns 
are most essential to success. 
In 2008, the Initiative evaluation team plans to use information documented in this report 
to study whether an individual mobilized in one election is then more likely to participate in 
subsequent elections — even if not contacted — as well as how many contacts or cycles it takes 
to turn a low-propensity voter into a habitual voter. 
The team hopes to explore additional message effects, including the difference between the 
effectiveness of messages focused solely on get-out-the-vote, messages that engage the voter through 
a survey on important problems, and messages that address a particular proposition or race on 
the ballot (while remaining neutral). 
Given the signifi cant costs of direct contact efforts, the team will look for ways to make indirect 
methods more effective, possibly through the use of social networks, by adding personalized touches 
to those outreach efforts, or by using multiple tactics in combination.
Topics Meriting Additional Analysis
• Effectiveness of second-round contacts with people who have expressed earlier a commitment to vote
• Impact of using local volunteers 
• Effectiveness of outreach strategies relative to voter age and language utilized in the communication
• Differences in using information-rich versus basic outreach messages
• Differences associated with qualitative campaign aspects, e.g., canvasser training
27 Nickerson (2007).
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